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Consolidations in the Canadian Diamond Industry($FASTF)

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Consolidations in the Canadian Diamond Industry($FASTF) > Forum $FASTF > RE Kaiser View modes: 
  • RE Kaiser

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    UBJECT: I do not believe that J. Kaiser is a fool Posted By: maigrichon
    Post Time: 2/10/2006 08:43
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    Fri Feb 10, 2006
    Tracker 2006-05: Shore Gold overplays a great hand
    Publisher: Kaiser Bottom-Fishing Report
    Author: Copyright 2006 John A Kaiser


    Tracker 2006-05

    February 10, 2006

    Shore Gold Inc (SGF-T: $7.26)

    Shore Gold overplays a great hand

    Synopsis: On February 6, 2006 De Beers Canada Inc filed a lawsuit against Shore Gold Inc (SGF-T: $7.26), Cameco Corp, UEM Inc and Kensington Resources Inc seeking to have set aside the "Fort a la Corne Joint Venture Voting Agreement" made effective on October 31, 2005. For a $10 million payment Shore Gold had obtained the right to vote the Cameco and UEM interests for its own account, giving it the power to take operatorship away from De Beers. The lawsuit appears to have been triggered by Shore Gold's decision to do just that. The lawsuit does not seek anything more than to stop Shore Gold from taking over the FALC JV and running it according to its own unorthodox approach to diamond exploration, an approach that bears some resemblance to that used in 1993-94 by Kennecott when it tackled the Tli Kwi Cho pipe with an aggressive underground bulk sampling program that relied on flawed micro diamond analysis and inadequate delineation of the DO27 pipe's internal geology. The Tli Kwi Cho bulk sample results wiped out $1 billion in the market capitalization of diamond exploration juniors. Unnecessarily so, it now seems, based on recent mini bulk sample results obtained by Peregrine Diamond Corp (PGD-V: $3.85). Recent micro diamond results from Peregrine's DO27 pipe suggest that the 100 cpht grade obtained by mini bulk sample in the heart of DO27 will map to the rest of its tonnage, opening the possibility that DO27 may yet prove to be a world class standalone diamond mine. A similar story of mapping vent results to the rest of the pipe is playing out at Shore Gold's Star project, but micro diamonds are being denied a heroic role. It's all in the petrography goes the party line, and therein lies the seed for a new market catastrophe brought on by hubris alone. Neither De Beers nor Shore Gold returns my calls, and both wish I would just write about gold stocks. One subscribes to my newsletter, the other used to but now bums email copies from other subscribers. Shore Gold and Kensington are among my best bottom-fish picks in both performance and analytical terms. I have gone from viewing Saskatchewan's Fort a la Corne diamond play as a hopeless cause to seeing those huge low grade kimberlite bodies as the future of Canadian diamond production. On January 21 at the Cambridge Gala Awards I presented Shore Gold with an Outstanding Achievement award for taking on an enormous risk to prove that the Saskatchewan diamonds are for real. But I have serious reservations about the exploration and corporate strategies adopted by Shore Gold which have needlessly exposed Shore Gold shareholders to substantial downside risk. I remain optimistic that Fort a la Corne will become a world class producer of diamonds, but I am concerned that this destiny will be postponed thanks to a slugfest that is the diamond equivalent of the ridiculous debate between "intelligent design" and "science" raging south of the border. I am consequently closing out the original Shore Gold bottom-fish buy recommendation at $7.25 with a final 25% Partial Sell. At the same time I am closing out the Kensington bottom-fish buy which I had rolled over into a Shore Gold Spec Cycle 100% Hold when the two merged on October 31, 2005. There may be good Spec Value Hunter opportunities down the road when the dust settles, but for bottom-fishers the Shore Gold and Kensington bottom-fish buy cycles should be considered closed out at $7.25.

    The Shore Gold bottom-fish buy recommendation in the $0.76-$1.00 range made May 24, 2002 has delivered a 473% gain from the $1 buy limit after accounting for all the partial sells. The Kensington buy recommendation in the $1.00-$1.25 range made February 1, 2005 has delivered a 271% gain after adjusting for the 0.64 Shore Gold for 1 Kensington merger on November 1, 2005. The Kensington gain is modest, but the Kensington buy was part of a switch recommendation (25% partial sell Shore Gold at $5.09) aimed at bottom-fishers who bought Shore Gold at $1 or lower. Shore Gold may end up higher, perhaps even taken out by a major, but the price is vulnerable to a serious setback during the short term. Whatever the fate of Shore Gold itself, I think the Fort a la Corne diamond field is on track to joining the ranks of Canadian diamond producers. For those bottom-fishers suffering separation anxiety, there are a couple other Saskatchewan diamond juniors with interesting but cheaper plays that I will point out shortly into which you can shift your allegiance. One of them is even controlled by the Shore Gold principals. These juniors do not qualify as bottom-fish buys, but they may qualify as Good Relative or even Absolute Spec Value buys. The rest of this Tracker explains my concerns about the Shore Gold situation.

    The old myth about De Beers as a suppressor of diamond supply
    The turbulence in Shore Gold's market is related to an old controversy about whether the goal of De Beers is to bring new diamond mines on stream or to suppress the arrival of new diamond supply. This controversy was once valid, but is no longer so because the diamond supply monopoly De Beers once enjoyed has dissolved. Not only has competition emerged from new sources in Canada and Russia, but trouble has developed on the home turf of De Beers in Africa. An overarching concern, however, is that all the major diamond mines, which currently supply more than two-thirds of the world's annual diamond production by value, will be depleted within 20 years. At the same time a new super cycle called the "Rise of Asia" is introducing a quantum shift in demand. What many people do not realize is that diamonds, unlike gold, are a consumer disposable like desktop personal computers that simply disappear. There is no aftermarket for diamonds. They are collectibles which only rarely get converted into cash. The supply of gem diamonds, consequently, must be continually renewed with fresh production. Yet another poorly understood fact is that diamonds are intrinsically worthless because they are a luxury good whose demand has been cultivated through clever and persistent marketing during the past century. Although each diamond is a unique collectible, no diamond is as special as an original Van Gogh painting. Furthermore, we are getting ever closer to cheap commercial reproduction of diamonds in the form of synthetic gem diamonds, which are as indistinguishable from a natural diamond to the naked eye as is a good reproduction of a Van Gogh painting. If the price of natural diamonds soars as a result of supply shortages, the danger exists that consumers will simply lose interest in natural diamonds and will make do with the synthetic version. Such a shift will probably destroy the mystique of diamonds, and collapse whatever demand remains for natural diamonds even as improving technology shrinks the cost of synthetic gem diamonds. The only defense against the collapse of rough diamond supply is a steady supply of natural diamonds. In so far that De Beers is still the biggest single supplier of rough diamonds, it is in the interest of De Beers to ensure a critical threshold supply of rough diamonds, preferably through channels that it controls. The demand for diamonds has grown so big that it is no longer necessary to control supply, a situation that parallels the oil market where OPEC is pumping at full capacity without tanking the price of oil. In fact, diamond suppliers face the same problem as oil suppliers in that a price too high will result in the development of alternative energy supplies that lead to the development of non-oil energy consumption infrastructure which permanently shatters the demand for oil. De Beers is well aware of this dynamic, and because its own existence is premised on consumption of natural diamonds as a luxury good, it has the greatest incentive to avert the consequences of supply shortfalls. The old paradigm of De Beers as a diamond supply suppressor is no longer relevant.

    For a long time Kensington did suffer from heel dragging by De Beers
    The sorry history of the Fort a la Corne diamond play, however, is testimony to the fact that this paradigm shift in the attitude of De Beers was not an overnight phenomenon. A 1998 agreement had established De Beers as operator of the Fort a la Corne Joint Venture, an arrangement that caused much grief for Kensington shareholders as De Beers somewhat half-heartedly explored the FALC kimberlites in a manner which thanks to the low grade nature of the diamondiferous kimberlites was incapable of delivering the sort of results the market wanted as evidence that Fort a la Corne had world class economic potential. The onward lurching nature of the De Beers program trapped Kensington on a dilution treadmill as it had to keep going back to the market at the same price to fund its share of exploration costs.

    Shore Gold's risky shot at proving Sakstachewan diamonds are the right stuff
    In 2003 Shore Gold resolved to escape a similar trap by jumping to a large underground bulk sampling program centered on the heart of the large 100% owned Star kimberlite. The goal was to demonstrate that the 300 million tonne Star body had a high enough rock value to justify development as a mine. The move was regarded as risky because it was feared that hydrostatic pressure in the 100 metres of overburden would create insurmountable water problems. The 25,000 tonne bulk sample was successful, yielding 3,791 carats from 20,649 tonnes of Early Joli Fou kimberlite for an indicated grade of 18.36 cpht. The actual value of the diamond parcel averaged US $110 per carat, while a best fit value modeled by WWW International Diamond Consultants Ltd came in at US $135 per carat. The resulting US $25 per tonne rock value was high enough to view Star as potentially economic in terms of a large tonnage open pit mining scenario, provided the grade and quality of the kimberlite sampled in the Star vent area extrapolated to the rest of the Early Joli Fou kimberlite.

    The assumption that the rock value established within the 30-50 million tonne vent area sampled by the underground program maps to the rest of the 200 million tonnes of Early Joil Fou kimberlite is key to the dream target supposition that Star hosts a diamond resource with an in situ value of US $5 billion or more. The basis for this assumption, however, is questionable.

    Micro and Macro Diamond Curves are normally part of the same continuum
    During early exploration Shore Gold relied heavily on micro diamond results from core holes in the vent area as justification for further work. Shore Gold's use of micro diamonds was flawed in that it did not use the sieve based system which eventually became the Canadian standard for reporting micro diamond results and which today is used by competent diamond exploration companies to model macro grade potential. Companies now use "total diamond analysis" to model grade and resource potential. In total diamond analysis one combines the micro diamond curve obtained through caustic fusion or acid dissolution of small kimberlite samples with the macro diamond curve obtained through dense media separation of larger "bulk" or "mini-bulk" samples. This approach is only valid when the samples come from the same kimberlite unit as defined by petrology and indicator mineral chemistry. The key to total diamond analysis is that the macro grade is comprised only of diamonds above the commercial cutoff size, which is roughly the recovery cutoff for the dense media separation process used to recover diamonds from bulk samples.

    Hey, don't be so cheap, this ain't sandpaper, it's diamond paper
    Shore Gold never understood this distinction, and estimated grade potential by dividing the total weight of all micro diamonds by the sample weight, just as Kennecott did in 1993 before it charged ahead with its ill-fated Tli Kwi Cho underground bulk sample. ACA Howe International Ltd dutifully repeats these preposterous calculated grade estimates in the latest Shore Gold technical report without qualification or clarification that such numbers are meaningless. People like myself know that such numbers are nonsense, but your average investor and mining analyst for whom these documents are intended should not be expected to know such details. They know carats per tonne is how the grade of a diamond pipe is reported, and they know that the $ per carat value is based on the value of commercial sized diamonds. It is thus irresponsible to present grades which include the weight of worthless micro diamonds without big footnotes warning that such a grade is not what people normally understand when they talk about the grade of a diamond pipe.

    Pigheaded reluctance to dump old mistakes a honeypot for class action lawsuits
    Ten years ago this sort of confusion was par for the course, but to see this sort of thing in a technical report filed in November 2005 by a diamond "junior" which just boosted its working capital to $250 million through a $120 million bought deal is beyond inexcusable. Don't kid yourself by thinking Kaiser is just crying a big sob story on behalf of a few Saskatchewan wheat farmers who would never trouble to call up a class action lawyer with complaints about misleading diamond grade disclosures. I have seen those same numbers used in a research report by a mining analyst working for a brokerage firm that had financed Shore Gold. If Shore Gold's stock price ever hits the skids I can guarantee you it will be somebody other than Saskatchewan shareholders who will raise a big stink. And that will hurt Saskatchewan shareholders confident that the good old boys in Saskatoon could never have done any wrong. Consider how close a call Shore Gold had when it discovered in December that its reported bulk sample weights actually represented imperial short tons rather than metric tonnes. Luckily for Shore Gold the correction resulted in a 20% grade boost rather than a 20% grade cut. Just a mistake, but one which had it gone in the other direction would have buried Shore Gold in class action lawsuits. Why? Because at the end of the day it is scale and fine margins which will make or break the Fort a la Corne diamond pipes.

    Not too long ago even De Beers made big extrapolation blunders
    To establish a diamond resource a company must use delineation drilling to define the internal geology of a kimberlite body, use bulk sampling to establish a macro grade and value for each geological unit, determine the linkage between the micro and macro size distribution curves for each unit, and use further delineation drilling to confirm the distribution of the macro grade throughout each geological unit. Without all this delineation work bulk sample results reveal little more than the recovered grade of the sample itself, a mistake that even De Beers was making several years ago when it allowed Kensington to extrapolate a mini bulk sample grade to an enormous tonnage of the 140/141 kimberlite. When subsequent work revealed extraordinary complexity and grade variation within the 140/141 kimberlite De Beers effectively retracted those earlier grade-tonnage estimates.

    George Read claims micro diamond analysis not helpful at Star
    The exploration approach adopted by Shore Gold toward its Star kimberlite is deeply flawed because the company is pretending to know that the grade and value found in the vent of the Star kimberlite maps to the rest of the body. George Read has repeatedly evaded my questions about how the micro diamond curves match up with the macro diamond curves in the underground bulk sample area, and if they do, how do they compare with the micro diamond curves in the peripheral Early Joli Fou kimberlite that represents Star's critical mass. Eventually he told me that Shore Gold had decided not to do micro diamond analysis. Ever since then I have been very nervous about what will happen when Shore Gold starts to report its large diameter drill hole bulk sample results.

    Even if Shore Gold has reason to believe that micro diamonds are unreliable, and that only bulk sampling can give a reliable estimate of grade, it is only guessing that the rock value it has established by processing 35,000 tonnes within a physical footprint of less than 50 million tonnes can be extrapolated to the rest of the 200 million tonnes of Early Joli Fou kimberlite it has identified through petrographic logging of drill core.

    Shore Gold should explain why it thinks Star's vent maps to its peripheries
    Shore Gold has not demonstrated that the carrying capacity of the kimberlite in the vent area exists everywhere within the Early Joli Fou kimberlite, and even if it did, Shore Gold does not yet have the information needed to confirm that the diamond content is consistent. This is an important point because the tonnage so far sampled by Shore Gold is on its own economically worthless, or worth substantially less than implied by the stock price. Shore Gold needs all of the Early Joli Fou kimberlite to have a similar rock value for Star to make it as a standalone mining operation. That is what the current large diameter drilling program consisting of 72 RC holes 1.2 metres in diameter is designed to accomplish. The peculiar decision by management to reject micro diamond analysis as an evaluation tool causes me considerable worry, because management has not presented evidence justifying such a decision. I have a nagging suspicion that the decision was made to avoid undermining expectations.

    If LDD hole bulk sample results fall short, watch out below
    Shore Gold has cored at least 123 pilot holes representing more than 29,000 metres near the LDD holes as part of its prefeasibility study on the Star project. This drilling has indicated the presence of lots of Cantuar and Pense kimberlite about whose diamond content little is known but about which Shore Gold has expressed great optimism. Hopefully the Cantuar and Pense kimberlite volume has not been at the expense of projected Early Joli Fou kimberlite. The market will be paying close attention when Shore Gold starts reporting the results for the 10,000 tonnes it expects to recover through the LDD holes. If these do not resemble the grades in the vent area, Shore Gold's stock price will come under pressure. I'm not saying that the rock value in the vent does not map to the rest of the kimberlite; my concern is the market's dangerous assumption fostered by Shore Gold that this mapping is already a given. Success is already built into the market price, which means that shareholders face more downside than upside from near term news flow. We are facing a potential market bust now aggravated by the De Beers lawsuit which could bring exploration on the FALC JV to a standstill.

    De Beers appeared to be pushing ahead full throttle at FALC
    The "voting agreement" between Cameco, UEM and Shore Gold that De Beers is seeking to have set aside gave Shore Gold the unconditional right to vote their interests in the Fort a la Corne Joint Venture in accordance with Shore Gold's wishes. This development, which gave Shore Gold the ability to assume operatorship of the FALC JV, did not appear to provoke a reaction from De Beers until Shore Gold made it clear that it intended to replace a 43 month exploration program the four parties had agreed to in early 2005 with its own materially different "Operations Plan and Budget". The 2005 "Advance Exploration and Evaluation Study" represented a sea change in De Beers' attitude toward Fort a la Corne, a change triggered in part by the success Shore Gold had in demonstrating that the Star kimberlite hosts large, good quality diamonds.

    The trick is to mine the high rock value stuff first and the lower value stuff later
    The De Beers "AE&E" study was intended to provide a thorough evaluation of the entire Fort a la Corne kimberlite field so that in 3.5 years De Beers would be in a position to know if it is worthwhile to pursue development of a world class mining operation where multiple pits would feed a giant central processing facility. Not only would De Beers and Kensington know whether such a project would be worthwhile, but they also would know which kimberlite bodies to mine first. This was critical, because the Fort a la Corne field, the largest diamondiferous field in the world, has the potential to produce diamonds for many decades. Most of the field is presently marginal, but over time diamond prices can be expected to outpace inflation, with the result that marginal resources will eventually be profitable. The trick is to mine the highest rock value first and save the lower rock value for later.

    De Beers' approach does not provide the razzle dazzle craved by simpletons
    The exploration methodology chosen by De Beers would have generated an enormous database of the FALC field's potential at a cost to all the partners estimated at $150-200 million. The "AE&E" study was designed from a big company perspective. It could not yield a make or break decision until it was complete, and the information it generated would lack the flash and sparkle of a brute force bulk sampling program such as Shore Gold undertook at Star. Nevertheless, the De Beers approach would have moved FALC forward in a big way.

    How many ways are there to screw up the advantage of a brilliant move?
    It was thus a brilliant move when Shore Gold engineered a merger with Kensington in 2005 that gave it a 42% stake in the Fort a la Corne JV. Shore Gold could continue to develop its own promising 100% Star kimberlite and easily fund its share of the FALC JV. But the "voting agreement" was a new twist whose timing did not make much sense. If the "AE&E" joint venture agreement did not exist, paying Cameco and UEM $10 million for their vote and wresting operatorship from De Beers would certainly have made sense. I have in the past suggested such a course of action if De Beers continued to drag its heels with regard to FALC. But the heel dragging stopped last year. One could argue that it was worthwhile for Shore Gold to pay $10 million to obtain a hammer over De Beers in case its enthusiasm for the "AE&E" flagged. But to actually swing that hammer to knock De Beers aside when there was no evidence that De Beers was dragging its heels, and to seek to implement an entirely different exploration program is in my view an act of stupidity and hubris which could cost Shore Gold shareholders dearly.

    De Beers sees irreparable loss and damage in a misguided exploration strategy
    De Beers had no choice but to respond with a lawsuit because Shore Gold's action will cause it "irreparable loss and damage". I would add that the victims will include everybody, including Shore Gold and the citizens of Saskatchewan. This "irreparable loss and damage" can be construed as an opportunity cost risk inherent in the possibility that Shore Gold could blow itself up financially and end up in some sort of legal limbo that stalls the development of FALC for a very long time. But more likely De Beers believes that Shore Gold's exploration approach would delay a diamond mine in Saskatchewan, or result in the development of a money losing hole in the ground subsidized by Saskatchewan pride and taxpayers. Both of these scenarios represent opportunity costs for a diamond major which is very aware of a growing supply-demand imbalance in the diamond market. The possibility that gold bulk miner Newmont would ride to the rescue with its non-existent diamond expertise is not overly bracing.

    Shore Gold has no qualms wasting money pandering to promotional needs
    The "materially different" exploration approaches of the two parties is not about money, but about exploration methodology. Shore Gold's initial 25,000 tonne underground bulk sample was a gutsy move for which I have nothing but the highest praise. But the 15,000 tonnes Shore Gold has since then extracted from underground in an effort to boost its total diamond parcel to more than 6,000 carats is an expensive distraction designed to shower ignorant investment bankers with large diamonds; unfortunately the large stones have been a mixed bag of white, off-white and grey diamonds that will not obviously boost the average carat value of the parcel. Until exploration demonstrates that the rock value in the vent maps to the rest of the Star kimberlite, this expense is a waste of money unless one cynically argues that it was the price Shore Gold had to pay to reel in $120 million from a bunch of fund managers.

    He could have had it all, but he had to be a bigshot...
    De Beers has reacted with a lawsuit because it does not want to fund an expensive exploration program based on a misguided interpretation of the Fort a la Corne kimberlites. And before anybody starts accusing me of being soft on De Beers, allow me to suggest that there is ruthless calculation in the timing of the lawsuit. The whole point of the Kensington merger was to provide insurance against the Star results falling short of expectations and give Shore Gold a piece of Saskatchewan's real crown jewel, the entire Fort a la Corne kimberlite field controlled by the FALC JV. Ken MacNeill could have had it all, but he chose to rampage around in the china shop like some barnyard stud. In doing so Ken MacNeill has exposed Shore Gold shareholders to a situation where further work at FALC may be stalled just as the key LDD bulk sample holes start to trickle in. Shore Gold management and its consultants, of course, believe that these LDD results will be very similar to the underground bulk sample results obtained in the vent of the Star kimberlite. I pray that they are right, but my prayers are rarely answered, which may be why I do not spend much time praying.

    Are the Stockhouse morons correct that De Beers is pure evil?
    Shore Gold's expectations are not based on the similarity of micro diamond curves in the heart and peripheries of the Star kimberlite. Its expectations appear to be based largely on the mineralogical similarity of the kimberlite, a similarity that purportedly includes the kimberlite's coarseness, otherwise known as the "carrying capacity". If the LDD hole results grade the same as the underground samples, George Read's team will deservedly be crowned as petrological geniuses. But if the results are lower, meaning that the Star resource will fall below the economic threshold, then we have a problem, a problem which will be reflected in a lower share price. De Beers has access to same Star information as the rest of us, but has a significantly better internal understanding of what makes the Fort a la Corne kimberlites tick. Is De Beers so Machiavellian evil that it timed its lawsuit so as to remove the FALC JV crutch just when Shore Gold might really need to lean on it to support its share price? A fair number of shriekers on the Stockhouse Bullboard seem to think so, though I am less inclined to assign that much cleverness to De Beers. It is a very juicy conspiracy theory, especially if you throw in the wrinkle that the goal of De Beers is to stir up disgruntled Kensington shareholders with the notion that Ken MacNeill used a dwarf star to suck up their galaxy.

    Forget that comment about Ken MacNeill as another Robert Friedland
    Shore Gold's rush to take charge of the FALC joint venture and initiate a Star-like brute force bulk sampling program is either a strategic blunder based on ignorance or a desperate measure to switch the market's attention from looming disappointment at Star. If the latter, I have to shake my head, for the litigation launched by De Beers was foreseeable, as I pointed out in Tracker 2005-10. I have to kick myself for suggesting that Ken MacNeill might be the next Robert Friedland. He seems more like a country bumpkin being played by city slicker investment bankers who have set him up to betray his Saskatchewan roots.

    De Beers lawsuit has sufficient merit to occupy the courts long enough to hurt Shore Gold
    The decision to barge into the FALC JV could cost Shore Gold shareholders some short term grief, and delay the development of a world class diamond mine in Saskatchewan. The De Beers lawsuit is merely trying to maintain the status quo, which is not the heel-dragging status quo of a few years ago. De Beers may have a case based on legal technicalities related to the original joint venture agreement. I have looked at the statement of claim and can see how De Beers might have a case. However, what the market seems to be missing is that a De Beers legal victory would not hurt Shore Gold and the prospect that FALC will be developed as a diamond mine. A long delay due to litigation, however, hurts Saskatchewan and Shore Gold. The only positive thing Shore Gold has accomplished is to encourage De Beers to make it clear that it cares very much about the future of FALC.

    The solution is simple: don't fall on your own sword
    Having successfully yanked De Beers' chain Ken MacNeill should back down and get back Shore Gold's $10 million. But he may have boxed himself into a corner. Had he left the "AE&E" JV agreement alone, he could have cajoled Cameco and UEM at some later date to vote with Shore Gold without formalizing a "voting trust" if it became clear De Beers was slipping back into old habits. Now there is a possibility that if De Beers prevails in the courts and the court dictates that a "right of first refusal" was triggered by the attempted sale of the voting rights, De Beers might itself fork over $10 million and lock up the FALC JV for seven years. De Beers is not likely to deploy such a hardball tactic because it is well aware of the incestuous nature of Saskatchewan's politics and industry, and my sense is that De Beers is taking the Fort a la Corne diamond field very seriously as a major potential future supply of rough diamonds in a secure jurisdiction. I suspect De Beers would be quite happy to see Shore Gold just scrap the voting agreement, sit down at the joint venture table, and take a closer look at its exploration plans. But it may very well be that somebody desperately needs to prove that big swinging dicks do not just hang out in New York, London or Toronto. What a shame that such a great story as the Saskatchewan diamond play has been hijacked by an agenda so contrary to the down-to-earth nature of Shore Gold's shareholder base.

    *JK does not own any of the securities mentioned herein

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