Monday, February 04, 2008
John Bougearel
SuccssfulTradingTips.com
Can Overindebtedness in the Housing Industry Lead to a Debt-Deflation Spiral and Collapse of the US Economy?
"No
emergency can justify the return to inflation." Ludwig Von Mises said
eons ago. So what would Von Mises say in response to the current cycle
of aggressive monetary easing by the Fed, I wonder?
As bad as
the inflationary pressures are emanating from the energy and commodity
sectors, there is a strong deflationary headwind playing out in the
housing market and taking hold of the economy in a manner similar to
the gripped the US economy during the Great Depression of the 1930's.
I
mean, why else would the Fed so aggressively and so suddenly attempt to
stimulate the economy with excessive monetary ease and advocate swift
and decisive government intervention with fiscal stimulus? Do you think
they don't know the moral hazards of what they are doing? And why did
George Soros just last week go on record as saying that the US economy
has reached the culmination point of a sixty year credit boom and that
we were now entering an era of a prolonged and painful credit
contraction?
It seems that what appears to be at stake here are
the risks of another debt-deflation spiral like we had in the 1930's
and therein lies the Feds' concerns. Even if they won't speak of the
downside risks in more than an opaque sense, others are beginning to
sound the alarms.
Consider this if you will: "In the fourth
quarter of 2007, new foreclosures averaged 2,939 a day, double the pace
of a year earlier. In the 1930s, lenders were seizing homes at an
average rate of 3,000 a day, adjusted for today's housing stock size,"
according to RealtyTrac Inc.,
US mortgage foreclosures are set to
top 1 million this year and home prices are falling at the fastest pace
since the Great Depression. Bloomberg reported that the median home
prices peaked in July 2006 at $230,000, and as of January 2008, the
median home price has fallen 9.5% to $208,400 eighteen months later.
Merrill
Lynch's economist David Rosenberg sees "potential for another 25% to
30% downside over the next two years" in home prices on top of the
already 9% drop. A 35% drop from the peak median home price of $230,000
essentially reprices it to $151,000 in 2010. Many homeowners at risk
have no money down in their home. To a degree then, the financial
burden will not fall on the homeowners losing their homes, but back on
the financial institutions and loan originators involved in this whole
credit creation/lending process - as well as US taxpayers.
Financial
institutions real debt burdens are beginning to soar amidst a current
debt deflation crisis created by escalating foreclosures and falling
home prices. To mitigate the burden of this growing crisis, there is
anecdotal evidence banks are beginning to liquidate these unwanted
assets at firesale prices. Deutsche Bank and other banks have been
slashing prices on repossessed homes to get rid of them. In a recent
transaction mentioned on Business Week's Hot Property blog, Deutsche
Bank sold a house in Woodbridge, Va. in December for $150,000, less
than half its last sale price of $315,000 in the spring of 2005.
If
the median home price declines anywhere near 25%, this could spell
T-R-O-U-B-L-E for the U.S. economy. "Keep in mind, says Merrill's
Rosenberg, that the relatively puny price decline to date has already
pushed home-loan delinquencies to their highest level in 20 years."
The Call for Intervention and Lots of it
Lehman
Brothers Thomas Russo said "The direction we are heading isn't a good
one. We need significant fiscal and monetary intervention. The measures
being taken by the Hope Now program to freeze ARM resets being
advocated by everyone from Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, GS, JP
Morgan, "just aren't enough" says Russo.
"The whole financial
system has taken an amazing hit already and the bulk of the mortgage
resets are still to come...declining home values will prompt people to
snap their wallets shut [leading to underconsumption]. ...About $550
billion of subprime loans will reset before 2009 and most borrowers
will have no option except to walk away because the drop in home prices
and an increase in lending standards will prevent them from refinancing
or selling."
Housing Crisis is Already Reaching Catastrophic Proportion
William
McCarthy, a 62 yr old mortgage broker who declared bankruptcy in July
2007 when his 18 yr old mortgage business failed said he had "a client
who called me sobbing because his wife committed suicide rather than
face eviction."
McCarthy himself is facing eviction Feb 11
after his lender foreclosed on the interest only ARM he and his wife
took out in 2005 for a ranch home without stairs that would benefit his
wife's heart condition. Their plan was to sell their old residence
before the ARM reset on the new mortgage, but the old home never sold.
"Now, they are losing both properties" reports BN. His wife "goes to
bed crying every night, and there is nothing I can do" says McCarthy.
The banks won't even return my calls."
But Will Intervention Work?
However
much Russo and others would like to see interventionist methods work,
many government agency programs simply are not working as hoped for.
President Bush proposed helping 1 million subprime borrowers avoid
foreclosure with state tax exempt bonds, but "states down want the risk
any more than private lenders do." States and state municipalities are
in a boatload of fiscal trouble to begin with. Falling home prices mean
falling property tax receipts. If anything, they will have to borrow
money to stay afloat themselves!
But that is not even the issue
- 'yet.' State housing agencies already offering refinancing options
are finding that "more than 50% of subprime borrowers are being
rejected by state programs because their homes have lost too much value
or they have accumulated too much debt. Often the borrower just has too
much debt and the home does not have the value to support the
refinancing" said Geoffrey Cooper at MGIC. That is the beauty of how
negative amortization and MEW works.
Dawn Larzelere, director
of the Ohio Housing Finance Agency found many applicants to be
ineligible because they'd missed a mortgage payment in the last year.
"I don't think our lending standards are too high. I think people have
gotten in too far over their head" she said.
It is for reasons
like this that Alex Pollock, former president of the Federal Home Loan
Bank of Chicago, is urging "the creation of a federal lending agency
based on the Home Owners Loan Corp., or HOLC, created by Congress
during the Great Depression."
An Eternal Hosing Boom is Out of the Question
General
economic theories about 'overinvestment' and 'overindebtedness' suggest
that once a boom ends and the contraction begins, the economic downturn
is accompanied by deflation. That certainly seems consistent with where
are current boom-bust cycle in the US housing market appears to be
headed.
Wilhelm Ropke described the phenomena as follows, "the
credit expansion setting the boom going proceeds by way of the interest
rate being 'too low.' The too low rate invited a general increase in
investment which then leads the mechanism of the boom drifting towards
its ultimate debacle. ..Introducing a general overinvestment disrupts
the equilibrium of the economic system.
It allows more to be
invested than is saved and makes available the necessary increase in
money capital from credits which do not originate from savings but are
created out of nothing through the banking system...The demonstration
that the credit expansion of the boom leads to overinvestment provides
at the same time a proof that the capital formation induced by credit
creation, and the extension of production that it sets going, leads to
a painful reaction expressing itself in the crisis and depression. This
reaction can indeed be postponed by a further increase of the credit
supply but only at the price of a corresponding aggravation of the
ultimate reaction. An eternal boom is therefore out of the question. -
Crises and Cycles circa 1936
Laissez-Faire Economists of the 1930's
Elaborating
on the solutions attempted by the government and Federal Reserve during
the 1930's Freidrich Hayek observed that, "To combat the depression by
a forced credit expansion is to attempt to cure the evil by the very
means which bought it about - because we are suffering from a
misdirection, we want to create further misdirection....We must not
forget that for the last six to eight years monetary policy all over
the world has followed the advise of the 'stabilisers.' It is high time
that their influence which has already done enough harm should be
overthrown." - Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle circa 1933
A
century before Von Mises, Ropke, and Hayek, there was John Stuart Mill,
another laissez-faire proponent who held the opinion that "in all the
more advanced communities, the majority of things are worse done by the
intervention of government than the individuals most interested in the
matter would do them, or cause them to be done, if left to themselves."
- Principles of Political Economy, circa 1848
Modern Day Laissez-Faire
Echoing
Wilhelm Ropke of yesteryear is Pimco's Mark Kiesel who has recently
been quoted as saying that "rescuing borrowers will only worsen the
economic misery for everyone. Keeping the market from correcting itself
only prolongs the problem....The housing market will find its own
bottom, without a government bailout." Kiesel, I think, is suggesting
that market forces today are akin to the debt-deflationary spiral of
the 1930's and that they are simply far more powerful than any
interventionists measures can hope to achieve. Certainly, the evidence
thus far suggests that intervention up to this point
is having very little impact on the evolving housing crisis to date.
Debt Obligations of Every Description Running Everywhere
Irving
Fisher, another economist who lived through the roaring twenties and
the Great Depression, believed the "great cause of overborrowing" was
easy money. "The depression grew out of a boom, which started in a
credit currency boom, which started from a debt boom...there were
international debts of every description, long and short, public and
private, the obligations running in every direction."
Debt Obligations of our Modern Day Shadow Banking System
What
Fisher describes about obligations running in every direction back in
the 1930's is eerily similar to the modern day runs on our Shadow
Banking System (a term coined by Bill Gross and Paul McCauley and which
I have written about in earlier reports), where subprime counterparty
risks are unknown and unquantifiable, morphing into a thousand
"Waldo's" popping up everywhere as the housing crisis deepens.
The
heavy debt burdens borne by subprime borrowers today are fast becoming
heavier with falling home prices and ARM resets. The big fear today is
that falling home prices amidst ARM resets they can ill afford will
lead to distressed selling which will further depress already falling
home prices - creating the very same debt deflation spiral that Irving
Fisher gave witness to 70 years ago.
The Liquidation Stampede
Irving
Fisher goes on to say that "if liquidation for some reason gets into a
stampede, it wipes out credit currency, which lowers the price level
and reduces profits, which forces business into further liquidation,
which further lowers the price levels and reduces profits and so on and
on - a tail spin into depression, ...We now come to the paradox that if
the debt gets big enough, the very act of liquidation puts the world
deeper into debt than ever.
Each dollar represented in the
unpaid balance grows faster than the number of the dollars reduced by
liquidation. Payments could not catch up with the 'real' indebtedness -
the more we paid the more we owed...the peoples real debts heavier than
in 1929, heavier than in 1932, heavier than ever before in all history.
Their interest, rent, and taxes are also heavier, and at the same time,
their real income and real wealth are less."
Props to Consumption are Disappearing Fast
According
to calculations by Macroeconomic Advisers, the last time household real
estate, stocks and real incomes all declined in a quarter was during
the 1974 recession, reported Bloomberg on Jan 29. `Wealth had been
rising because of strong home prices'' and stock gains, said Chris
Varvares of Macroeconomic Advisers.
``Now, we are losing that
prop to consumption, so it all comes down to growth in real income.''
As these three-legged props to consumption are all flattened out
simultaneously, the downward risks to consumer spending and
'underconsumption,' as well as the economy begin to mushroom. The only
viable prop left to the economy may just be a huge increase in gov't
spending (see Gross' comments below).
We live in times with
striking parallels to Ropke's and Fisher's 1930's style depression. We
already have rising interest rates on falling home values (via ARM
resets) and overindebtedness. Just how far are we from the brink of a
1930's style liquidation that "gets into a stampede?"
How badly
this story plays out in the end, no one has a clue. Do the
interventionists and 'stabilizers' save the day? Or will the boom-bust
theories of Laissez-Faire economists Ropke and Kiesel come to fruition
simply because market forces are just too powerful?
The D Word for Deflation and Depression
One
thing is crystal, there is unanimous consensus, even if the D word has
yet to be uttered, on both sides of the camp that the US economy is at
risk of entering the mouth of a debt deflation spiral, one which could
put us on the brink of economic collapse reminiscent of the Great
Depression. I am not saying the scenario is a plausible one, but this
worst case scenario is more real and more tangible than at any other
time in my life.
Bill Gross in summarizing the main tenet of Paul
Krugman's book "The Return of Depression Economics, 1998, argues that
"the crucial task of future policy would be to bolster demand as was
the case in the FDR-driven 1930's as opposed to encourage supply which
has been the case since the Reagan revolution."
"Because', Gross
goes on to say, ‘demand in the form of consumption has been
artificially and fictitiously stimulated in recent years by financial
engineering run amuck, there is a legitimate question as to whether its
black hole imploding destructiveness can be totally countered with
another dose of lower yields and deficit spending packages. The $150
billion "return to sender" deficit plan advanced by Bush and the
Congress, for instance, amounts to just 1% of GDP and is of marginal
benefit to long-term prosperity'...
'The U.S. needs a Krugman
"demand-based" fiscal package alright, but a $300-$500 billion
permanent one, because as the system of modern day levered shadow
finance slows to a crawl or even contracts at the edges, its ability to
systemically fertilize economic growth must be called into question. To
provide a stable recovery path, government spending needs to fill the
gap - not consumption. Public works programs, badly needed
infrastructure repairs, as well as spending on research and development
projects should form the heart of our path to recovery.'
"As
Keynes theorized and then Krugman affirmed, when private demand
falters, it becomes the responsibility of government to fill the
breach. Because it likely will not do so effectively until after a new
Administration is elected in late 2008, the U.S. economy and its
somewhat coupled global companion will sleep walk for some time and a
resumption of prosperity as we knew it will be dependent on reforms of
monetary and fiscal policy resembling the 1930s more than our past
decade." - Gross' emphasis not mine
Sources:
Business Week
Bloomberg News
Pimco.com
Marc Faber - Tomorrow's Gold