In Part I, readers were reminded yet again of the totally unsustainable parameters in the gold and silver markets. To be specific, manipulating gold and silver prices lower (for several decades) is resulting in the collapse of inventories – with the only possible long-term outcome being the collapse of the bankers’ fraudulent paper-bullion markets.

As with any other item, the collapse in inventories (and the increasing scarcity that implies) means that gold and silver prices must concurrently soar as the banksters’ paper-bullion scams collapse. Putting these two factors together, readers will soon see that the final rupturing of the paper-bullion markets does not necessarily have to result from any sort of formal default event.

Indeed, with the Banking Oligarchs in total control of both our crooked markets and our even more crooked market ‘regulators’, it seems highly unlikely that a formal default would be allowed to occur. Much more likely, as bullion inventories (most likely in the silver market) reach zero the servant-regulators will simply declare an indefinite suspension of trading in the paper markets.

If plummeting inventories are leading toward a default-event, yet formal default would not/will not be allowed to occur; what other mechanism could produce the inevitable rupture of these inventory-depleted markets? I hinted at the answer at the end of Part I: decoupling.

Certainly most readers could deduce for themselves what I was implying: a decoupling of prices between the (legitimate) “physical” bullion market and the corrupt, paper-bullion markets controlled by the bullion banks. However, while the bottom-line may be quite obvious, the path taking us to that final endpoint is likely not nearly as apparent.

In part, this is due to the fact that such a decoupling could be caused by a multitude of factors, including parameters which have nothing to do with the bullion market (directly) at all. For example, as the Crash of ’08 intensified and insurance behemoth AIG teetered on bankruptcy; the bullion funds for which it was guarantor briefly plunged in value. Obviously, had AIG not received its $180 billion in emergency hand-outs from the U.S. government and had been allowed to go bankrupt (like Lehman Brothers); then those bullion funds could have collapsed...

 

Read the rest:

 

The Road To Bullion Default: Part II